Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.     

From Social Pacts to Productivity Boards

Market solutions can be a way for small deregulated states like the Baltics to grow, but they are not a viable path for the EMU area as a whole or for the larger countries like France, Germany or Italy. As most of the challenges have to be addressed at the national level only, an interaction of flexible institutions (as the social pacts were) in coordination with developing European institutions (like a European unemployment scheme) can offer a more stable environment for growth.     

Preferential Rules of Origin and the Multilateral Trading System: Pro-Development Policy Options

With the proliferation of regional trade agreements since the late 1980s and early 1990s, preferential rules of origin have also proliferated. The discussion on these rules has gradually shifted from a purely technical discussion (“how to establish the origin of goods not wholly obtained in one country”, and hence, “how to apply trade preferences in these cases”) to a wider discussion also touching upon the transaction costs caused by having a “spaghetti bowl” of rules, and the actual or presumed neo-protectionist use that is being made of them. In the context of the discussion on possible policy options for developing countries simultaneously involved in (or negotiating) regional and multilateral trade agreements, this article will first give a brief overview of the findings of the recent empirical literature. Some indications are then presented as to what such policy options could look like. This paper was first presented at the Ad-hoc Expert Group Meeting on The Development Interface between the Multilateral Trading System and Regional Trade Agreements, Session III Regulatory Provisions in RTAs, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 15-16 March 2007. It is partly based on P. De Lombaerde, L. J. Garay : Preferential Rules of Origin: EU and NAFTA Regulatory Models and the WTO, in: The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, No. 6, 2005, pp. 953-994; and L. J. Garay, P. De Lombaerde: Preferential Rules of Origin: Models and Levels of Rulemaking, in: S. Woolcock (ed.): Trade and Investment Rulemaking: The Role of Regional and Bilateral Agreements, Tokyo 2006, UNU Press, pp. 78-106.     

Business services,the new engine of French regional growth

This article analyses the evolution of employment in the French regions, putting the accent on business service firms. A ‘shift and share’ type of analysis shows that a primary decentralisation in tertiary activities seems to emerge in the 1990s, essentially pertaining to ancillary producer services. An explanatory analysis backs up the general validity of the regional economic base theory: the basic activities, to which business services can quite legitimately be attached, certainly play a leading long-term role on global employment dynamics. Finally it shows that over the past 20 years, the regional offer of services to businesses has been the major discriminating variable between regions, greatly influencing the evolution of basic employment and thus confirming the vital driving force of this sector in regional dynamics.     

Economic sociology: a historical perspective

In this paper we briefly recall what is meant by economic sociology, basing our definition principally on the works of R. Swedberg and M. Cranovetter. We then focus on the questions and problematics which are more particularly relevant to the history of economic and sociological thought in such a way as to make explicit the kind of past in relation to which economic sociology is most pertinent. We shall thus be induced to correct certain explanations and to propose a slightly different perspective on the origin of economic sociology. This historical work enables us to formulate a definition of economic sociology based on two key concepts - economic institution and economic action - and allows us to articulate what economic sociology actually is, rather than merely describing what it is not. Finally, we show that these propositions are not without interest in relation to the present-day economic sociology that tends to go by the name - made fasionable by Granovetter and Swedberg - of ‘New Economic Sociology.’     

A High‐Frequency Investigation of the Interaction between Volatility and DAX Returns

One of the most noticeable stylised facts in finance is that stock index returns are negatively correlated with changes in volatility. The economic rationale for the effect is still controversial. The competing explanations have different implications for the origin of the relationship: Are volatility changes induced by index movements, or inversely, does volatility drive index returns? To differentiate between the alternative hypotheses, we analyse the lead‐lag relationship of option implied volatility and index return in Germany based on Granger causality tests and impulse‐response functions. Our dataset consists of all transactions in DAX options and futures over the time period from 1995 to 2005. Analyzing returns over 5‐minute intervals, we find that the relationship is return‐driven in the sense that index returns Granger cause volatility changes. This causal relationship is statistically and economically significant and can be clearly separated from the contemporaneous correlation. The largest part of the implied volatility response occurs immediately, but we also observe a smaller retarded reaction for up to one hour. A volatility feedback effect is not discernible. If it exists, the stock market appears to correctly anticipate its importance for index returns.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Holmström’s [Holmström, B., 1982/1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Originally published in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki] career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: (i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; (ii) decision errors take time to decrease; (iii) while subjects’ average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner’s curse arises on the labor demand side.